The Silver Bridge Upon Completion
This view is from Point Pleasant, looking west to Ohio. The railroad truss, just to the north, still stands.
Photo by US Federal Highway Administration
On December 15, 1967 at approximately 4:50 PM, while packed with cars during rush hour, the Silver Bridge that crossed the Ohio River between Point Pleasant, West Virginia and Kanauga, Ohio, collapsed. 46 people perished in the collapse, two bodies were never found.
The 1928 bridge, which took its name from the aluminum paint that covered it, used a modified eyebar chain design that was relatively new at the time of its construction. Although eyebar chain bridges had been built around the world since the early 19th century, the Silver Bridge used a modified design without the extra redundancy of earlier eyebar chain bridges. After the collapse, another eyebar chain bridge of similar design, upriver at St. Marys, was immediately closed. The St. Marys bridge was demolished in 1971.
During the failure analysis, it was found that Eyebar #330, closer to the Ohio side of the Silver Bridge, had developed a tiny stress crack, perhaps even during manufacture. When the crack reached 0.1" in depth, it went critical and failed soon after. Because all components of the bridge were balanced together, the failure of that one component caused all the others to fail. Witnesses reported that the bridge collapse took about one minute.
"The Mothman Prophesies" add to the mystique of the area, and to the bridge collapse. Legend has it that the mysterious "Mothman" fortold the collapse of the bridge.
According to the NTSB, there were three major contributors to the failure of the bridge:
"1. In 1927, when the bridge was designed, the phenomena of stress corrosion and corrosion fatigue were not known to occur in the classes of bridge material used under conditions of exposure normally encountered in rural areas.
"2. The location of the flaw was inaccessible to visual inspection.
"3. The flaw could not have been detected by any inspection method known in the state of the art today without disassembly of the eyebar joint."
At the time of its construction, the typical automobile was light and small. A Model T Ford weighed 1,500 pounds but by 1967, family cars were twice the size and weighed two or three times the weight of a typical contemporary automobile. Bumper-to-bumper traffic jams, unheard of in 1928, were common in 1967. The bridge carried far more weight and traffic, on a daily basis, than designers in 1927 could ever have imagined. (Note that the replacement bridge carries over 25,000 vehicles per day.)
As a result of the Silver Bridge disaster, the NBIS, National Bridge Inspection Standard, was created. NBIS mandates that all bridges in the United States, longer than 20 feet, must be inspected every two years.
Construction of a replacement bridge for this important crossing began almost immediately, because the nearest crossing was the Pomeroy-Mason Bridge about 14 miles upriver. The replacement, the Silver Memorial Bridge opened exactly two years later, on December 15, 1969.
There is a great deal of information about the collapse of the Silver Bridge and even the Mothman Prophecies are available. The Point Pleasant River Museum has displays and pages about the bridge. The Silver Bridge appears on Nicolas Janberg's Structurae Database with even more links to Silver Bridge information. The West Virginia Historical Society also published an article about the collapse, The Collapse of The Silver Bridge, in 2001.
Even though the tragedy of the Silver Bridge collapse resulted in infrastructure awareness and the creation of the NBIS, the fact is, bridge inspections are mostly visual. Tiny stress fractures are not always in a visible location. The same type of failure was missed in an NBIS inspection in 2000, on an approach span of the Daniel Webster Hoan Bridge in Milwaukee, where the span failure did not result in total collapse, nor loss of life. Tragically, a similar undetected flaw resulted in the 2007 catastrophic failure of the Mississippi River/I-35 Bridge in Minneapolis.
In the future, new bridges promise to be "smart structures" with electronic monitoring to detect changes in a bridge, indicating potential problems, before they become problems of catastrophic size. (Some bridges are already being so monitored, but not many.)
So-called "smart structures" are all in the future. For now, we must remember the victims of bridge tragedies and count on the visual NBIS to keep our infrastructure in place.
Author's Note: Portions of this article first appeared in the News section here, on December 15, 2008, in a "This day in history..." feature.
Pieces of the bridge can be seen at Point Pleasant River Museum.
This bridge is said to have been haunted by the famous "Mothman." A book, The Mothman Prophecies, a book by John Keel (1975) made the legend and the collapse of the bridge famous. A movie with the same name also came out in 2002 which features the story and the bridge. As such, I have placed this bridge in the "Haunted" bridges category. Perhaps today would be a good day to find qualified bridge candidates to place in this category.
Here is an outstanding historical article about this bridge collapse in a Popular Science: http://books.google.com/books?id=lSYDAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA102&dq=D...
There is a book being published about the Silver Bridge.This is a link to the news article in the Point Pleasant Daily Register about it.
"I would comment that the I-35W Bridge collapse was due to gusset plates that were incorrectly sized for the bridge. From what I understand, the incorrect size was installed on the bridge when it was built due to an error in the original plans for the bridge. That defect, combined with increased loading from a combination of construction work and rush hour traffic triggered the failure and collapse. That being said, I am not certain how much the quality of visual inspections would have helped. The key would have been to "check the work" on the original plans and recalculate stresses for the bridge based on plan specifications."
While it may be true that the gusset plates were too small, they held for 40 years. See? I put very little blame on the under-sized gusset plates. The blame must go majority to the inspection program. Not all, but majority. And then like every disaster, it was a multitude of missed opportunities that led to the collapse. If a good inspection program found and fixed cracked gussets on a regular basis, they would have eventually seen a pattern and investigated it....and subsequently found out that the gussets had been undersized all along.
It was a good bridge with good gusset plates. They could have even chosen to leave the undersized gussets in place, but inspect them more frequently. At least every 40 years...apparently. (Sarcasm: Cheap gussets....only lasted 40 years!)
The description of "smart bridges" that inspect themselves is interesting. In aircraft sheetmetal work, inspectors use eddy current among other means to inspect for cracks. The units are relatively small and affordable if not inexpensive. In all the millions of dollars involved in building a bridge, why couldn't eddy current inspection devices be installed on a permanent basis? These detectors could report to as many authorities as necessary...the highway department, the local highway patrol....whoever would be involved if a crack developed. I think devices like this are already in use on automated railroad track detectors. The train inspects the rail as it goes, so little problems don't turn into big ones.
Well,I wouldn't exactly use the term "cool" in describing a tragedy such as this with the loss of lives.But the information is valuable and important.We should all remember that in particular,2 communities (Pt.Pleasant and Gallopolis,OH) were permanently affected on the date of Dec.15,1967.
For those who like to travel abroad, the Hercilio Luz Bridge in Florianopolis, Brazil, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hercilio_Luz_Bridge is a bridge that remains today and is built to nearly the same design as the Silver Bridge. It even includes the same design of bizarre stiffening truss that lines up with the curve of the main eyebar catenary at the center of the bridge. It has been bypassed by a modern bridge but remains in place as a historic bridge.
In the article added to this page for the Silver Bridge, I would comment that the I-35W Bridge collapse was due to gusset plates that were incorrectly sized for the bridge. From what I understand, the incorrect size was installed on the bridge when it was built due to an error in the original plans for the bridge. That defect, combined with increased loading from a combination of construction work and rush hour traffic triggered the failure and collapse. That being said, I am not certain how much the quality of visual inspections would have helped. The key would have been to "check the work" on the original plans and recalculate stresses for the bridge based on plan specifications.
Also, in addition to the visual inspection method mentioned in the article, there are Ultrasonic methods exist and are frequently employed to detect problems on certain structural parts such as pins on trusses. These go beyond visual inspections and allow for a much greater degree of confidence in the safety of historic truss bridges.
Also, bridges need not be new to have the "smart" detection features mentioned. Historic bridges such as metal truss bridges can be restored and fitted with devices that provide levels of safety and control just as robust as any modern bridge. The Maple Road Bridge http://www.historicbridges.org/truss/maple/index.htm in Michigan was restored and it has a monitoring system and a supplemental cable system that can be adjusted if problems in the tension are recorded.
My opinion is that inspections need to be improved by conducting underwater inspections more frequently, perhaps at a rate equal to the required rate for standard top-side inspections. The recent closure of the Crown Point Bridge and subsequent assessment that between five year underwater inspections the bridge had gone from safe and open to traffic to being in such a risk of collapse that it was too dangerous to work around as part of a repair project.
this is cool